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This dissertation examines the relationship between CEO compensation components and the 
innovation capabilities of publicly traded companies in the United States of America. Based 
on an extensive literature review, I hypothesize that payment components with convex 
payoffs as well as those with long-term payoffs have a positive influence on innovation. 
Further, I expect cash based compensations to have no or a negative influence on innovation. 
Lastly, I develop a hypothesis regarding instruments that protect executives in case of failure 
and their positive influence on innovation. Using a sample of S&P 1500 constituents over 14 
years, I find that an increase of the proportion of stock options in CEO compensation has a 
positive influence on innovation input and output as well as on innovation effectiveness. I 
obtain similar results for the proportion of long term incentives in the total compensation. For 
salary and bonus, I find that a higher proportion has a negative influence on innovation input 
and output. After a sample split, I show that all findings related to compensation components 
only hold for firms in less innovative industries. In a subsequent small sample analysis, I 
characterize elements of golden parachute agreements and classify them in accordance to the 
protection they offer to CEOs. Subsequently, I find evidence that more innovative firms use 
more and further developed agreements. I conclude that such protections for failure can 
influence the motivation of executives to innovate. 
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Some of the most relevant contributions to management literature emphasise the 
importance of innovation in the global economy. Economical and managerial research has 
been influenced over decades by Joseph Schumpeter and his conclusion that “(…) creative 
destruction [innovation] is the essential fact about capitalism” (Schumpeter, 1942, p. 83). In 
his widely used and taught management concepts, Peter Drucker incorporated the importance 
of innovation as “(…) the means by which the entrepreneur either creates new wealth-
producing resources or endows existing resources with enhanced potential for creating 
wealth.” (Drucker, 1998, p. 2). In addition, as one of the most influential business theorists of 
the last 50 years (Whelan, 2011), Clayton Christensen defined disruptive innovation as the 
key to future success in business (Christensen, 1997). 
Although these contributions to management literature were made several years ago, 
innovation has not lost its relevance in modern business reality. According to latest global 
CEO surveys, executives rank innovation as a top-4 priority, indicating it to be among the 
challenges that “(…) remain vitally important for driving business growth and ensuring a 
sustainable future” (Mitchell et al, 2014, p. 23) 
A significant literature concentrates on multiple economic factors and their impact on 
innovation. However, relatively few studies have explored the importance of individual 
incentives to innovate in corporations. This thesis aims to examine this relationship. In an 
extensive literature review, I explain why incentives matter and develop hypotheses regarding 
CEO incentives and their effects on the innovation capabilities of the firms the CEOs manage. 
In a subsequent econometrical analysis, I test the relationship between different pay 
components for CEOs and innovation using a large sample of US firms. My findings 
generally support my hypotheses. I find that compensations with convex or long-term payoff 
structures incentivise CEOs to promote innovation in firms. 
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 These findings hold for innovation input, measured using research and development 
expenses, as well as for innovation output, measure using patent applications. In a subsample, 
the findings also hold for innovation quality as well as for innovation effectiveness. Given the 
limited scope of this thesis, I do not perform advanced tests for the robustness of my findings 
but I give guidance and suggestions for future research. 
In a subsequent qualitative small sample analysis, I find evidence that contracts, which 
protect the CEO in case of failure, are positively related to the innovativeness of firms. Based 
on the existing literature on this topic, I conclude that protected CEOs are more likely to 
engage in potentially risky exploratory projects then unprotected CEOs. Given the limited 
sample size, these findings are not generalizable but can give motivation for future research.  
This thesis contributes to the existing literature on executive compensation as well as to 
the research on innovation. To my knowledge, I am the first to examine how different 
components of executive compensation contribute to innovation while controlling for the total 
compensation. Furthermore, I present a novel in-depth research on the effects of 
compensation in low- versus high innovation industries that results in the somewhat puzzling 
conclusion that compensation is only important in less innovative industries. Even though I 
deliver potential explanations for those findings, future research might concentrate on 
delivering further explanations for them. Finally, my qualitative analyses on golden parachute 
agreements might motivate more research in this controversial field. 
The remainder of this thesis is structured as follows: Chapter 2 discusses relevant 
literature on executive compensation and potential effects on innovation. Based on this 
examination, four hypotheses are presented. Chapter 3 presents and discusses the data as well 
as the results of my large sample empirical analysis. Chapter 4 examines multiple elements of 
golden parachute agreements and their protection capabilities. Chapter 5 concludes. 
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2. Related Literature and Hypothesis Development 
To offer a basis for the discussion of the impact of executives’ incentives on innovation in 
firms, I first critically review the relevant literature. I start by defining innovation and 
discussing it in the context of different interests within modern organisations. Secondly, I 
introduce the literature on the effects of specific compensation components on managerial 
behaviour and the associated empirical results. Finally, I discuss perspectives on contracts that 
protect executives from failure and their relationship with innovation. Within the examination 
of related literature, I develop and present four hypotheses that are tested in the subsequent 
analyses. 
2.1 Innovation in the Context of Executive Compensation 
From an economical point of view, innovation has been defined as the production of new 
knowledge, as a result of research or incidental observations (Arrow, 1969). In a more holistic 
definition, Schumpeter (1942) explains the process of innovation as the constant 
recombination of knowledge and by this, the disruption of existing solutions. The final 
definition of innovation is still a current research topic (Baregheh et al., 2009) but for 
simplicity, this discussion will use a combined definition by Mowery and Rosenberg (1979). 
They define innovation as a process of exploration including the application of new 
approaches in order to create wealth. The creation of social and private benefits through 
innovation is broadly accepted (Mansfield et al., 1977), and, because of a positive impact on 
company value, innovation is viewed to be in the interest of shareholders (Denis, 1999). 
With regards to innovation in the context of an organisation, March (1991) describes the 
importance of the trade-off decision made by individuals between exploration of new options 
and the exploitation of well-known solutions. He argues that the level of innovation in a 
cooperation is to a large extend determined by such individual decisions. Furthermore, in his 
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model, exploitation leads to payoffs that are positive, proximate, and predictable. Exploration, 
on the other hand, has uncertain, distant and often negative returns. This view is shared by 
Holmstrom (1989). He explains that corporate innovations are idiosyncratically risky but offer 
a potential for extraordinary returns. Using a basic agent theory model, Holmstrom (1989) 
derives that innovation activities in firms can be encouraged by choosing specific provisions 
for incentive contracts.1 Combining the findings of March (1991) and Holmstrom (1989), 
innovation can be expected to be carried out by individuals in the organisation, who need to 
be encouraged to pursue uncertain new approaches that create wealth (exploration), rather 
than use exploitation to secure a certain payoff. 
The chief executive officer (CEO) of an organisation is the main decision maker and 
resource manager (Capstone, 2003). With regards to innovation, literature often assumes that 
the CEO is essential in guiding the organisation to an optimal level of innovation in line with 
his ultimate task, the maximization of shareholder wealth (e.g. Manso, 2011; Francis et al., 
2011). 
Early relevant literature discussing risky decision behaviour of managerial agents is Berle 
and Means (1932). They state that risk aversion can potentially make manager-controlled 
firms less likely to engage in risky processes. The authors argue that managers, in standard 
compensation contracts, bear the cost (dismissal) of unsuccessful risk-related ventures, but 
only minimal shares of the profits. The understanding of such agency problems with regards 
to firm control has changed dramatically through the evolvement of research focussing on the 
use of executive compensation. Starting with Jensen and Meckling (1976), this research 
stream suggests that specific compensation contracts are designed to alleviate conflicts of 
interests and motivate managers to act to the benefits of shareholders. This claim has been 
tested for a variety of implications including innovation. Holmstrom (1989) suggests, besides 
                                                 
1 As discussed in more detail bellow, Holmstrom (1989) finds that incentive contracts must offer a long-term 
payoff and a tolerance for failure in order to motive agents to innovate. 
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others, that the design of executive compensation is, through the reduction of agency 
conflicts, a significant determinant of the innovation produced by a firm.  
This line of thought will be further developed in the following sections. For this, it is 
beneficial to distinguish between different kinds of compensation components and further 
types of compensation arrangements. From the distinction of specific attributes of 
compensation components, I will develop hypotheses regarding the individual impact on 
innovation. 
2.2 Elements of Executive Compensation and Management Incentives 
The structure of executive pay is constantly evolving and often determined in response to 
current economic and political trends. Even though the magnitude of the overall 
compensation as well as the usage of specific compensation elements follows trends in time, 
the individual incentivisation characteristics remain constant (Murphy, 2012). 
2.2.1 Cash Compensation 
The base salary is a fixed salary that CEOs are awarded regardless of their individual 
performance. As this payment does not motivate the CEO to increase the effort for his work, 
it is the least desirable compensation form from a shareholder perspective. Accordingly, only 
parts of the CEO compensation are typically based on base salary (Murphy, 2012). 
CEO bonuses are payoffs that depend on short-term performance, often based on 
accounting measures. This creates indirect ties between CEO wealth and shareholder wealth.2 
At the same time, through an inherent suboptimal design, such contracts may motivate the 
CEO to manage earnings and to focus only on short-term results instead of long-term value 
creation. In addition to this, the non-linearity in the pay-performance relationship of bonus 
contracts may also affect the risk-taking behaviour of CEOs. Especially when CEOs face 
                                                 
2 This is assuming that higher accounting returns are correlated with positive stock price developments. 
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higher bonus cuts for lower performance compared to the bonus increase of high 
performance, risky business decisions might be avoided (Murphy and Jensen, 2011).  
The base salary and bonus plans are therefore unlikely to motivate CEOs to engage in 
risky, experimental innovation. Moreover, whilst economists provide plenty of evidence for a 
positive reward-effort relationship in agent models and experiments, psychologists arrive at 
dissimilar conclusions (Ederer and Manso, 2011). Numerous studies show that pay-for-
performance improves effort in simple, routine tasks but that it has no or even the opposite 
effect in tasks that require creativity and the development of new approaches (e.g. Amabile, 
1996). This discussion leads to the following hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 1: The amount of cash based compensation, such as salary and 
bonus, as proportion of the total compensation of CEOs will have no significant 
or a negative impact on the innovation capabilities of firms. 
2.2.2 Equity Compensation 
Compensating CEOs with equity has the goal to align their incentives closer to the 
interest of shareholders (Hall and Liebman, 1998). In addition to their cash compensation, 
executives therefore receive stock awards and stock options of the firm employing them. 
Starting with Jensen and Murphy (1990), there have been discussions about different equity 
compensations and their individual power to maximize firm value. The authors argue that the 
pay-performance sensitivity is much weaker as predicted by agency theory. To underline their 
claim, they present an empirical analysis concluding that for each $1,000 change in 
shareholder wealth, CEO wealth changes by only $3.25. Even though subsequent literature 
argue that this pay-for-performance sensitivity is understated (e.g. Hall and Liebman, 1998), 
the optimality of executive contracts still remains questioned (Murphy, 2012). 
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Besides this interest-alignment dilemma, firms might face a more specific risk-related 
agency problem caused by equity compensation. Shareholders typically hold well-diversified 
stock portfolios. The incremental, idiosyncratic risk that is added through risky projects in one 
firm does therefore not affect their overall risk. Risk-averse CEOs on the other hand, are less 
diversified, i.e. the firm that employs them is the major source of risk in their portfolio. 
Accordingly, they might forgo positive net-present-value projects if these increase firm risk. 
Such behaviour, in turn, might destroy shareholder wealth (Fama and Jensen, 1983).  
With a focus on precarious business decision, Smith and Stulz (1985) argue that the 
wrong contracting might cause the executive to be hesitant in engaging with value 
maximizing activities. Using a state-preference model of firm value, they derive that 
executives choose suboptimal levels of hedging if they are not rewarded to bear additional 
risk. The authors show further that compensation elements such as common stock or equity 
options can turn managers into risk-seekers and, through this, maximize shareholder wealth. 
Lambert (1986) supports this view and stresses the point that a lower observability of the 
executive effort, i.e. higher asymmetry of information, might increase such agency problems. 
Modelling the agent’s decision-making process for risky projects, he shows that the problem 
can be overcome by imposing risk on the executive. The model illustrates how a 
compensation that is highly contingent upon cash flow can lead to a disagreement between 
shareholders and executives and might even motivate agents to overinvest in high-risk 
projects. The right level and structure of equity compensation seems therefore to be essential 
to effectively motivate the CEO. 
To examine potential limitations of common stock as part of compensation agreements, 
some financial economists explore the convexity and the slope of the relationship between 
firm risk and executive wealth. This relationship is named vega. Guay (1999) started this line 
of thought with an examination of the sensitivity of CEO wealth to the volatility of equity 
stock. Using a sample of 278 CEOs, Black-Scholes option valuation and multivariate 
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regression models, he shows that stock options are the major driver for convexity in CEO pay. 
Guay (1999) concludes that this convexity can influence CEO behaviour. Moreover, he tests 
the impact of a number of firm characteristics on the sensitivity of CEO wealth to equity risk. 
Concluding the findings of this model, he argues that firms with high growth opportunities 
add more convexity to CEO compensation in order to overcome risk-related agency problems. 
This renews the hypothesis formulated by Smith and Watts (1992) that firms with greater 
investment opportunities tie CEO wealth more closely to performance. 
While this research focuses on explaining the composition of executive pay through 
growth opportunities and other firm characteristics, another stream of research focuses on the 
effect the structure of executive pay has on managerial decisions. Using a sample including 
the largest US firms, Coles et al. (2006) examine how the sensitivity of CEO wealth to equity 
volatility changes risky firm policies in a controlled econometrical model. Their findings 
suggest that vega has a positive influence on investment in R&D, a negative influence on 
investment in property, land and equipment and leads to a higher leverage. The authors 
conclude that the level of vega influences precarious managerial decisions. Focussing on 
financial policy, Chava and Purnanandam (2010) come to the similar result that risk-seeking 
incentives from stock and option holdings motivate CEOs and CFOs to choose value creating, 
riskier finance structures. Finally, in a model that uses an exogenous shock, the change in 
takeover protection legislation, Low (2009) shows that if CEOs are exposed to a high vega, 
they are less likely to choose a value destroying reduction of firm risk following the 
legislation change. 
While the presented works convey a homogeneous picture on the positive impact of a 
higher vega on risk-taking behaviour, other studies show different results. Hayes et al. (2012) 
examined the impact of an exogenously caused reduction of convexity in compensation on 
risky investments and financial policies. Using a sample of 6,983 firm-year observations they 
do not find that the adoption of FAS 123R and a subsequent reduction of stock option usage 
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led to less risky firm policies. Consistent with those findings, Kini and Williams (2012) do 
not find a systematic relationship between risky managerial decisions and risk-taking 
incentives provided by vega. As the first authors to control for intra-organisational CEO 
promotion tournaments which, according to their research, add convexity to the payoffs of 
executives, they do not find additional risk-taking incentives provided by stock options.3 
These findings are difficult to reconcile with the majority of past research, but can 
nevertheless provide an understanding of the sensitivity of the discussed findings.  
As elements of innovation, such as R&D expenses, typically lead to a higher volatility in 
firm value, it is intuitive that vega might also have an impact on measures of innovation 
(Coles et al., 2006). Following this rational, Francis et al. (2011) examine empirically whether 
compensation determines innovation output in the form of patents and innovation quality, 
measured by patent citations. In a sample of 6,946 firm-years they show that the total 
portfolio of long-term incentives in the form of options is positively related to these measures. 
In a smaller sample of 300 US firms, Lerner and Wulf (2007) show that this relationship also 
holds for the use of vested stock and stock options as compensation of R&D executives and 
the innovation output of firms. Arguing that the main innovators in a firm are non-executive 
employees that contribute through their everyday work to the innovation capabilities of firms, 
Chang et al. (2015) find that firms produce more innovation when employees receive more 
stock options and those options have a longer expiration period. Motivated by this line of 
research, I formulate my second hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: An increase of stock options as proportion of total pay will result 
in a higher level of innovation in a corporation, regardless of the total 
compensation amount. 
                                                 
3 The authors define a promotion tournament as the competition for the role of CEO between senior executives. 




As discussed above, starting with Guay (1999), a large share of the formal literature on 
executive compensation focusses on compensation instruments that have convex payoffs. 
Even though research has identified stock options as the primary source of convexity, it is 
generally agreed that direct stock compensation, e.g. restricted stock, can also add convexity 
(Core and Guay, 1999). This is in line with a series of research that identifies long term 
incentives regardless of their payoff structure as determinants for innovation. Manso (2011) 
shows in an agent model that parts of the ideal incentive scheme to motivate innovation is a 
long-term compensation plan. In a later laboratory setting, Ederer and Manso (2013) confirm 
those findings. In a business simulation setup, participants with long-term incentives are more 
likely to explore new options and discover new business strategies. The authors argue that this 
is inconsistent with the widely-held belief that pay-for-performance cannot motivate 
creativity. 
In the context of managerial compensation, these findings motivate to examine the impact 
of compensation elements that offer only limited vega but a long-term payoff. Restricted 
stock has such characteristics and even though there is a recent rise in restricted stock as a part 
of the executive compensation (Murphy, 2012), the literature about motivational effects of it 
is limited. Similarly, long-term incentive plans offer long-term payoffs and have yet not been 
the focus of executive compensation research. 
This is the motivation behind the research conducted by Chi and Johnson (2008), who 
examine the relationship between restricted stock and corporate acquisitions. Using a sample 
of 1,013 firms, they find that longer vesting periods of stock, but not of stock options, are 
positively related to higher acquisitions announcements, higher post-merger profitability and 
negatively related to the paid premium. The authors argue that these effects create shareholder 
wealth and explain their findings through the longer vesting period of restricted stock 
incentives (4.38 years), compared to stock options (2.14 years). The rationale behind this is 
that for long-term decisions where executive have private information, such as corporate 
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acquisitions, long-term incentives with payoffs after the outcomes of the decision become 
observable, are favourable.  
Although these findings differ from the general belief that restricted stock and long-term 
incentive plans are a suboptimal incentive for CEOs (e.g. Lambert and Larcker, 2011), a 
comparable effect could be expected for innovation decisions. For these, similarly to 
acquisitions, executives might have private information and the impact of the innovation 
investment can only be observed and judged in the long-term future. This assumption 
motivates my third hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3: The proportion of restricted stock and long-term incentive plans 
in the total CEO compensation will have a positive impact on the innovation 
capabilities of firms. 
2.3 Tolerance for Failure and Innovation 
In addition to the long-term payoff characteristics, which are incremental to innovation, a 
stream of literature has also examined the effects of acceptance or even encouragement of 
early failure. Holmstrom (1989) is the first to show in an agent model that if executives are 
penalized for mistakes, they are unlikely to engage in activities that have a high probability of 
failure. Manso (2011) progresses these findings and uses a Bayesian decision model to show 
that it is crucial for innovation to employ a contract which exhibits tolerance for failures. He 
shows that if the agent receives a protection in case of early failure, he is more likely to start 
exploring new options rather than exploiting existing ones. Based on those findings, Ederer 
and Manso (2013) find in an experimental setting that tolerance for early failure is motivating 
exploration.4 Tian and Wang (2011) provide empirical evidence that the relationship between 
failure tolerance and innovation is positive. For a sample of 1,860 firms, they construct a 
                                                 
4 This is in addition to the findings regarding long-term incentives by Manso (2011) and Ederer and Manso 
(2013) that are discussed above. 
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venture capitalist failure tolerance measure and show that higher tolerance for failure has a 
positive impact on innovation, measured in patents. Eder and Manso (2011) argue that in the 
context of corporate governance, such tolerance for failure is resembled in golden parachutes. 
A golden parachute clause provides an executive with financial benefits, should the firm 
decide to retire him prior to the end of his employment contract (Capstone, 2003). Ederer and 
Manso (2011) argue that such a provision motivates the executive to engage in riskier 
exploration (innovation) as his downside risk, i.e. the risk from early termination, is limited.  
To verify this claim, O’Connor and Rafferty (2012) examine the impact of corporate 
governance, including provisions such as golden parachutes, and innovation, measured as 
R&D activity. In a series of least squares models, the authors do not find a consistent, 
significant relationship between R&D activities and any provisional factor of corporate 
governance. In contrast to this, Francis et al. (2011) find that golden parachute provisions are 
positively correlated with the number of patents held by a firm. They conclude that, after 
controlling for a series of other control variables, golden parachutes have a positive impact on 
the innovation capabilities of firms. These theoretical, experimental and empirical works 
inspire my fourth hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 4: High-innovation firms have, in comparison with low-innovation 
firms, more and further developed arrangements that protect the CEO in case 
of an early retirement. 
The first three hypotheses are tested in an econometric large sample analysis using a set 
of US firms and patent data as a measure of innovation. The fourth hypothesis is subsequently 




3. Large Sample Analysis 
Next, I test my developed hypotheses using a panel dataset and ordinary least squares 
(OLS) regression models. I begin by explaining my data sample, its sources and descriptive 
statistics. Subsequently, I use a series of OLS regression models to test the validity of my 
Hypotheses 1 to 3. Finally, I conclude my findings, evaluate the potential limitations of my 
analysis and make suggestions for future research. 
3.1 Data, Variables and Descriptive Statistics 
3.1.1 Measuring Innovation 
A critical aspect of my analysis is the measurement of innovation. The literature suggests 
a variety of ways to measure innovation. Obvious measures are a firm’s expenses for research 
and development (R&D) as research is seen as a crucial requirement for innovation. However, 
this measure is potentially limited as it is purely based on the assumption that higher R&D 
expenditures lead to higher innovation. This assumption does not account for differences in 
the quality of research conducted (i.e. innovation per R&D dollar spent). A company might 
have relatively high R&D expenditures but will not necessarily produce more innovation than 
its peers (Kochhar and David, 1996). Still, R&D expenditures can serve as a proxy for the 
intention to pursue innovation. In a competitive market, the allocation of funds into R&D is 
the most direct instrument to increase innovation (Kor, 2006). Accordingly, I measure the 
pursued innovation or innovation input with R&D scaled by book assets. 
The measurement of innovation output is somewhat more complex. After a firm created 
an innovation it is naturally interested in seeking a legal protection to guarantee the exclusive 
exploitation of this innovation. Patents offer such an exclusive right in exchange for a detailed 
disclosure of the invention for a limited time period (Fagerberg et al., 2006). Assuming that 
the majority of innovation is sought to be protected, the application for patents could serve as 
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a measure of innovation created (Balkin et al., 2000). Even though patent applications are 
widely used as a measure of innovation, they have some limitations. Patents differ drastically 
regarding their economic or technological significance. A patent application alone can 
therefore only imperfectly capture innovation. In addition, only technological inventions are 
patentable. This may exclude marketable products that are not based on new technologies 
such as services or financial products (Fagerberg et al., 2006). Accordingly, some authors 
argue that trademarks, as a protection for marketing assets, may be a more complete 
measurement of innovation outcome, especially in service and low-tech industries (Flikkema 
et al., 2014). Trademarks, on the other hand, might also include pure marketing innovations 
such as a brand launches, based on an existing technology that is not innovative. 
Taking these arguments into account, I use the count of firm patent applications as a 
proxy for innovation outcome. I reduce my sample as described below and excluded financial 
firms (high service level) to overcome some of the limitations of this measure. To mitigate the 
differences in economic and technological importance of an innovation, I included forward 
patent citations as a proxy for innovation quality and importance in my analysis. After a 
patent has been granted, it receives citations from subsequent patents that are based on its 
technology. Trajtenberg (1990) suggests that this is a strong measure of the social value of an 
innovation. Furthermore, Sandner (2011) found that the number of citations received by a 
patent are an important elements of the market valuation of it. 
3.1.2 Data and Sample 
My analysis includes constituents of the S&P 1500 between 1992 and 2005. This specific 
sample period was selected as the start date (1992) is the earliest year for which I could obtain 
compensation data and the end date (2005) is the last year for which patent data is available at 
the NBER patent database.  
15 
 
I use several databases to construct my sample. I begin by selecting the constituents of the 
S&P 1500 between 1992 and 2005 from the WRDS Compustat Database.5 Firm financials as 
well as stock returns are also based on the data available at Compustat. This includes data on 
R&D expenditures. I decided not to replace missing values by zero to give room for the 
possibility that not reporting R&D expenditures does not necessarily imply zero 
expenditures.6 Similarly, missing values are kept for all other financials, which leads to a 
variation in the effective sample size depending on the analysis. To obtain a more consistent 
panel, I delete firms that were part of the index for less than three years and keep only those 
firm-years during which the company was part of the index. Through the dynamic sample 
collection, any index in- and exclusion effects should be mitigated. Consistent with previous 
literature, I delete financial (6) and utility (9) firms based on the one-digit Standard Industry 
Classification (SIC) code, which leads to the exclusion of 493 firms. I obtain a sample of 
index constituents with sufficient accounting data that includes 1,856 firms with 16,082 firm-
years  
To create a measure of innovation output, I use the NBER patent database as Hall et al. 
(2001) suggest. This database contains 3.2 million patent applications that have been granted 
between 1976 and 2006.7 Next, I construct a patent application count per firm year for the 
entire sample which I use as a first measure of innovation output (variable Patents). To obtain 
a measure for the innovation relevance, I sum the total forward citations a patent received per 
firm year (Orig. Citations). Through the finite length of the sample, these raw citations might 
suffer from a truncation problem as patents granted earlier are likely to receive more citations 
                                                 
5 The S&P 1500 was formally launched in May 1995. Compustat does however provide a collection of 
constituents for earlier years. To reassure the sample quality, I compared it against a manual collection of the 
S&P 400 growth, the S&P 500 and S&P 600 growth constituents which only differed by 17 firms (0.63%).  
6 In addition, I ran my model with zero replacements for missing R&D expenditures and obtained consistent 
results (untabulated), the model had however a much lower R2. 
7 On average, there is a 2-year lag between patent application and patent grant. Hall et al. (2001) therefore 
suggest that the patents applied for in 2004 and 2005 are not fully covered in the NBER database (as not 
granted). One way to overcome this issue is by ending the sample period in 2003. I ran a separated version of 
my model excluding the years 2004 and 2005 and found similar results for all hypotheses. 
16 
 
than later patents. Hall et al. (2001) therefore recommend adjusting the citation count. The 
authors provide a weighting index that is based on an econometrical estimation of the shape 
of the citation-lag distribution in a quasi-structural model. To adjust the citations, I multiply 
them with the weighting index and create my second measure of innovation output 
(Citations). 
Compensation data is based on the Compustat ExecuComp database, which covers top 
executive pay since 1992. After dropping executives that are not CEOs, I follow Hayes et al. 
(2012) to calculate the yearly proportions of dollar compensation. I begin with the dollar 
value of cash compensation as the sum of salary and bonus8. Next, I add the Black-Scholes 
(1973) value of current options, long-term incentives plan and restricted stock to obtain total 
compensation. I then set all these single compensation elements in relation to the yearly total 
compensation and obtain P(Salary), P(Bonus), P(Cash), P(LtIns) and P(ResStock). In my 
regression models, I also use other CEO characteristics such as the age (CEO Age) and tenure 
(Tenure), based on ExecuComp data. 
Moving forward, I match all samples using the unique gvkey firm identifier. Patent and 
citation counts for firms that are part of the Compustat and ExecuComp sample but not of the 
patent database are set to zero. I follow Hirshleifer et al. (2012) and Chang et al. (2015) and 
exclud firms in four-digit SIC code industries that do not have a single patent in the 
observation period, which reduces the sample by 168 firms. In cases of a CEO change during 
the financial year, I only keep the later CEO. Furthermore, I follow the reasoning of Guay 
(1999) and exclude CEOs that own more than one-third of their corporation’s common stock, 
excluding options. This is because it can be questioned whether such CEOs receive 
compensation schemes that are designed to mitigate agency problems. This leads to the 
exclusion of nine CEOs and three firms. 
                                                 
8 Hayes et al. also include the estimated future pay-outs under non-equity incentives. This compensation 
component is not available for my sample period and therefore not included. 
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My final sample consists of 1,512 firms with 12,562 firm year observations, which are 
typically covered for 12 years (median) and managed by 2,746 individual CEOs. These firms 
applied for 323,589 patents that received 5,580,262 corrected citations. This sample may be 
subject to a survivorship bias as it only consists of index constituents. However, as I also kept 
those firms that are part of the index only for a limited time, this bias is limited. Patent and 
citation counts as the main innovation output measures are not subject to any survivorship 
bias as both will be collected at the time of application, regardless of the future development 
of the firm. 
3.1.3 Control Variables 
There is plenty of literature on the relationship between firm characteristics and 
innovation. To separate the effects of compensation components, I control for a number of 
other important innovation determinants. 
As one of the earliest researchers in this field, Schumpeter (1942) hypothesises that both, 
company size and market concentration play a major role in the innovation capabilities of 
firms. Building on those hypotheses, Kamien and Schwartz (1975) find strong evidence for 
the size effect and explain it with economies of scale and scope. To control for this effect, I 
include the natural logarithm of total assets (Ln(Assets)) in my model.9 With regards to 
competition, Aghion et al. (2005) studied the relationship between industry concentration and 
innovation in a growth model. In this setup, they find evidence that the relationship is not 
linear but rather resembles an inverted U-shape which means that innovation initially 
increases through competition but decreases in highly competitive market environments. 
Accordingly, I include the Herfindahl index (Herfindahl), calculated using the three-digit SIC 
code, and its square (Herfindahl2) in the regression. In addition, Hall and Ziedonis (2001) find 
                                                 
9 Following Hall and Ziedonis (2001), I also tested for the natural logarithm of sales as a proxy for firm size 
which led to identical results. 
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that capital-intense firms generate more innovation. I therefore control for capital intensity 
with the total assets scaled by sales (CapInt).  
Following Hirshleifer et al. (2012) and Chang et al. (2015), I furthermore control for 
profitability, growth opportunities, stock performance and capital structure. I calculate return 
on assets (ROA) by dividing EBITDA through total assets, as an indicator for profitability. 
The one-year sales growth (Sales growth) is included to understand the effects of growth 
opportunities on innovation. To control for influences of stock performance on innovation, I 
include the annualized buy-and-hold monthly total stock returns (Stock return) and the 
average stock return volatility over the past 36 months (Volatility) in my model. Lastly, I use 
the cash-to-total assets ratio (Cash) and short-term plus long-term debt over total assets 
(Leverage) to control for differences in firm financing. I winsorize all control variables at the 
1% level at both tails of the distribution. 
3.1.4 Descriptive Statistics  
Columns 1-3 of Table I provide descriptive statistics of all variables used for the whole 
sample. Depending on the below or above median proportion of cash compensation (P(Cash)) 
each year, I split my sample in two subsamples. I report the mean and mean differences for 
both subsamples as well as the levels of significance in columns 4-6 respectively. 
On average, a firm in my sample applied for roughly 26 patents and received 444 
citations based on the weighting correction suggested by Hall et al. (2001). Well-known 
technology firms such as Microsoft, Hewlett-Packard and Intel applied for the highest number 





The distribution of patent application is, however, highly skewed with about 51% (35%) 
of firms not applying for any patent in a given year (in the entire sample period). Accordingly, 
the median of patent application is zero. The average patent receives 17 citations. The 
citations per year are again highly skewed which leads to a comparably high standard 
deviation.10 
A typical CEO in my sample receives about 26% of total compensation in the form of 
salary. In combination with the bonus, these cash compensations makes up for almost half of 
                                                 
10 Other literature using the NBER patent database arrived at similar statistics for patent and citation count. This 
can be a first indication for the validity of my sample. 
Table I: Descriptive Statistics of Large Sample 
The table summarizes key descriptive statistics of the sample used in my analysis. The sample comprises of the 
constituents of the S&P 1500 between 1992 and 2005 (excluding financial and utility firms). It was split 
according to whether the proportion of cash compensation the CEO receives in a given year is higher 
(HighCash) or lower (LowCash) than the median of all CEOs in that year. I conduct a T-test for the differences 
in the means of firms that pay HighCash and LowCash to their CEO where *, **, and *** indicates 








(N=6,284) Difference  
  Mean Median Std.  Mean Mean T-test 
Dependent variables             
Patents 25.76 0.00 137.59   13.35 38.15 24.80*** 
Citations 444.22 0.00 2805.87   239.99 648.25 408.26*** 
Orig. Citations 194.39 0.00 1297.83   104.91 283.79 178.88*** 
R&D/Assets 0.05 0.03 0.06   0.05 0.06 0.02*** 
Explanatory varaiables             
P(Salary) 0.34 0.26 0.27   0.52 0.16 -0.36*** 
P(Bonus) 0.18 0.15 0.18   0.26 0.11 -0.15*** 
P(Options) 0.36 0.34 0.31   0.16 0.56 0.40*** 
P(ResStock) 0.06 0.00 0.14   0.03 0.08 0.05*** 
P(LtIns) 0.05 0.00 0.15   0.02 0.08 0.06*** 
P(Cash) 0.53 0.48 0.31   0.78 0.27 -0.51*** 
Control variable             
Tenure 7.96 6.00 7.43  8.92 7.02 -1.89*** 
CEO Age 55.85 56.00 7.66   56.77 54.92 -1.85*** 
Total Assets 5,108.23  1,058.21  20,712.09    3,071.62  7,142.90  4,071.28***  
ROA 0.15 0.15 0.09   0.15 0.15 0.00 
Herfindahl 0.30 0.25 0.21   0.32 0.29 -0.04*** 
CapInt 1.23 0.98 0.88   1.13 1.33 0.20*** 
Sales growth 0.11 0.08 0.23   0.10 0.13 0.03*** 
Cash 0.14 0.06 0.17   0.12 0.15 0.03*** 
Leverage 0.22 0.21 0.16   0.22 0.21 0.00 
Stock return 0.07 0.09 0.43   0.02 0.12 0.10*** 
Volatility 0.12 0.10 0.07   0.11 0.12 0.01*** 
Other firm characteristics       
Sales 4,405.83  1,098.23  12,355.11    2,636.03  6,173.95  3,537.92***  
P(Intangible) 0.14 0.08 0.15   0.13 0.15 0.02*** 
P(PPE) 0.31 0.26 0.21   0.32 0.30 -0.02*** 
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the total pay. Only a minority of CEOs receive zero Stock Options (26%, not tabulated), while 
the typical CEO receives 34% of pay from Stock Options.  
From the descriptive statistics it is observable that restricted stock and long-term 
incentive plans do not appear to contribute significantly to the dollar pay of CEOs. Only 22% 
(17%) of firms award restricted stock (long-term incentives).  
Firms in the high P(Cash) subsample relative to their peers in the low P(Cash) apply for 
significantly less patents, receive less citations and have lower adjusted R&D spending. 
Furthermore, firms that pay CEOs less cash compensations appear to have a lower property 
plant and equipment to total assets ratio (P(PPE)), a higher intangible assets to total assets 
ratio (P(Intangible)) and a higher stock price volatility. Even though no conclusion can be 
drawn without an inductive statistical analysis, these tendencies are in-line with existing 
literature such as Coles et al. (2006) and Core and Guay (1999). 
3.2 Regression Model Results 
Next, I use multivariate regression models to analyse the impact of a change in specific 
payment proportion on innovation while controlling for a series of independent variables. The 
regression models hereby generally follow: 
𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡+1
= 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛(𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑛𝑡)𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛾(𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠 )𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛿𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 + 𝜃𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡 
Where 𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡+1 are the three innovation measures, R&D/Assets, Patent count and 
Citation count of a firm 𝑖 at a lead year 𝑡 + 1. To control for unobserved heterogeneity, I 
follow Hirshleifer et al. (2012) and include year and industry fixed effect in all my models. 
Industry is hereby defined at the two-digit SIC level. 
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3.2.1 R&D Expenditures 
I hypothesize that cash based salary components will have none or have a negative impact 
on innovation while I expect option-based payment, restricted stock and long-time incentives 
to have a positive impact on innovation. I use a one-year lead for R&D/Assets to allow for a 
change in firm policy, caused by incentivization of the CEO, to reach an observable level. 
Column 1-4 of Table II present the outcomes of different OLS models using (1) firm and 
CEO characteristics, (2) the proportion of salary, (3) bonus, (4) all cash compensations, (5) 
options, (6) restricted stock, (7) long-term incentive plans and (8) all equity, respectively.  
In line with my Hypothesis 1, the coefficients of models (3) and (4) suggest that salary 
and bonus have a negative impact on my measure for innovation input. The coefficients for 
options in (5) and (8) however suggest that an increase in the proportion of pay in options 
results in an increase in R&D/Assets. The coefficient for the proportion of restricted stock is 
only significant if no other equity compensation elements are included in the equation (6). It 
is therefore likely that the proportion of restricted stock, as well as the proportion of long-term 
incentives a CEO receives do not have a significant impact on the R&D expenditures of the 
firm he manages. This is inconsistent with my third hypothesis.  
Given the setup of this regression, the consistently significant coefficients can be 
interpreted as in a unit change to unit change model. The results therefore suggest that a one 
percent increase in the proportion of options (0.01 of 1 unit) in combination with a one 
percent decrease in the proportion of bonus (-0.01 of 1 unit) would lead to an increase of 
0.00021 in R&D/Assets in the following year.11 Multiplied with the mean (median) total 
assets of $5,108.23m ($1,058.21m), this indicates an increase in R&D expenditures of $1.07m 
($0.22m). Furthermore, the findings suggest that an increase of total compensation would 
have a small but significant positive impact my measure of innovation input. 
                                                 




Table II: CEO Compensation and R&D Intensity 
The table summarizes the regression results for eight regression models using different elements of the proportion 
of CEO pay in addition to a series of explanatory variables. The dependent variable is R&D expenditures scaled 
by total assets, winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile. The sample includes the constituents of the S&P 1500 
between 1992 and 2005 (excluding financial and utility firms). As a number of firms do not report R&D 
expenditures, the number of observations is much lower than in the original sample. Fixed effects for year and 
industry are included in all regressions. The intercept has not been tabulated. T-statistics are shown in 
parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
 Dependent Variable =(R&D/Assets)t+1 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
P(Salary)   -0.005   -0.008*         
    (-1.42)   (-2.04)         
P(Bonus)     -0.008* -0.010**         
      (-2.31) (-2.74)         
P(Options)         0.012***     0.011*** 
          (5.16)     (3.63) 
P(ResStock)           -0.016***   -0.008 
            (-3.68)   (-1.71) 
P(LtIns)             -0.005 0.002 
              (-1.44) (0.41) 
Ln(TotCom) 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.005*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.003*** 
  (8.86) (4.50) (8.17) (3.39) (4.57) (9.29) (8.93) (3.84) 
Tenure -0.000** -0.000** -0.000** -0.000** -0.000** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000** 
  (-3.24) (-2.98) (-3.29) (-2.93) (-3.06) (-3.39) (-3.30) (-3.12) 
CEO Age -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.000*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.000*** 
  (-6.18) (-6.11) (-6.07) (-5.94) (-5.83) (-6.27) (-6.13) (-5.92) 
Ln(Assets) -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.003*** 
  (-7.51) (-6.95) (-7.13) (-6.30) (-6.14) (-7.53) (-7.51) (-6.13) 
Herfindahl -0.034*** -0.034*** -0.033*** -0.033*** -0.030** -0.033*** -0.033*** -0.030** 
  (-3.43) (-3.44) (-3.35) (-3.35) (-3.06) (-3.32) (-3.33) (-3.07) 
Herfindahl2 0.033*** 0.033*** 0.033*** 0.033*** 0.031** 0.032*** 0.032*** 0.031** 
  (3.45) (3.49) (3.38) (3.42) (3.19) (3.35) (3.37) (3.19) 
CapInt -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** 
  (-4.09) (-4.14) (-4.16) (-4.26) (-4.54) (-4.21) (-4.15) (-4.54) 
ROA -0.084*** -0.085*** -0.083*** -0.083*** -0.085*** -0.085*** -0.085*** -0.085*** 
  (-11.43) (-11.50) (-11.11) (-11.19) (-11.54) (-11.52) (-11.50) (-11.52) 
Sales growth 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  (0.22) (0.18) (0.42) (0.40) (0.20) (0.10) (0.15) (0.16) 
Stock return -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006*** 
  (-4.45) (-4.51) (-4.08) (-4.11) (-4.30) (-4.57) (-4.48) (-4.35) 
Volatility 0.139*** 0.140*** 0.137*** 0.138*** 0.136*** 0.138*** 0.138*** 0.136*** 
  (12.24) (12.28) (12.06) (12.09) (11.94) (12.19) (12.16) (11.96) 
Cash 0.115*** 0.115*** 0.115*** 0.115*** 0.113*** 0.114*** 0.114*** 0.113*** 
  (26.13) (26.11) (26.17) (26.16) (25.84) (25.98) (25.97) (25.78) 
Leverage -0.031*** -0.031*** -0.031*** -0.031*** -0.030*** -0.030*** -0.031*** -0.030*** 
  (-7.25) (-7.26) (-7.26) (-7.27) (-7.09) (-7.08) (-7.22) (-7.02) 
Obs. 6410 6410 6410 6410 6410 6410 6410 6410 
R2 0.536 0.536 0.536 0.536 0.538 0.537 0.536 0.538 





With regards to the control variables, the findings of all models suggest that a higher 
industry concentration has a small negative impact on innovation input. Inconsistent with 
prior literature, the coefficient of the Herfindahl2 measure indicates that the relationship 
between industry concentration and innovation follows a U-shape, suggesting that less-
concentrated industries as well as highly concentrated industries are more innovative. Also, I 
find that Stock Volatility and higher Cash Ratios have a positive influence on innovation. 
3.2.2 Number of Patents and Patent Citations 
Using my base model, I now examine the relationship between CEO payment 
components and the innovation output of a firm in a given year, proxied by the number of 
patents applied for. Subsequently, I use citations received by a patent as a measure of 
innovation quality. To overcome the skewness in the innovation measures, I use the natural 
logarithm of Patents (Ln(1+Patent)) and of Citations (Ln(1+Citations)) respectively. As the 
research on a delay between innovation effort and innovation output finds no evidence for the 
existence of such a lag (Hall et al., 1984), I use the one year lead for patents and citations.12 
Similar to my findings for innovation input, the coefficients in model (3) and (4) of Panel 
A in Table III suggest that a higher proportion of salary or bonus of the total pay a CEO 
receives in a given year, have a negative effect on the number of patents applied for in the 
next year. As shown in model (2), (3) and (4) of Panel B, the proportion of cash incentives 
does not seem to have a significant impact on my measure for innovation quality. The 
proportion of options does however have a significant impact (0.229) on innovation quantity 
as well as a weakly significant impact on innovation quality (0.222) in a model controlling for 
all equity incentives (8), tabulated in Panel B. Those findings are consistent with my first and 
second hypothesis. 
                                                 
12 The one year lead has been used to allow for organizational changes in innovation effort to reach an 
observable level. Similar results have been obtained using a two and three year lead for Ln(1+Patents) and 





Table III: CEO Compensation and Patenting Activity 
The tables summarize the regression results for 16 regression models using different elements of the proportion of 
CEO pay in addition to a series of explanatory variables. The dependent variables are one year leads of the natural 
logarithm of one plus patent count (Panel A) and one plus the corrected sum of patent citations using weightings 
suggested in the literature (Panel B). The sample includes the constituents of the S&P 1500 between 1992 and 
2005 (excluding financial and utility firms). Fixed effects for year and industry are included in all regressions. 
The intercept has not been tabulated. T-statistics are shown in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 
the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
 Panel A Dependent Variable = Ln(1+Patents)t+1 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
P(Salary)   -0.069   -0.142         
    (-0.82)   (-1.63)         
P(Bonus)     -0.203** -0.238**         
      (-2.68) (-3.03)         
P(Options)         0.163**     0.229*** 
          (3.14)     (3.42) 
P(ResStock)           -0.346***   -0.147 
            (-3.63)   (-1.34) 
P(LtIns)             0.166 0.324** 
              (1.93) (3.08) 
Ln(TotCom) 0.030* 0.016 0.022 -0.007 0.002 0.037** 0.022 -0.021 
  (2.19) (0.76) (1.59) (-0.33) (0.15) (2.70) (1.56) (-0.99) 
Tenure -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 
  (-1.27) (-1.16) (-1.20) (-0.95) (-1.11) (-1.43) (-1.19) (-0.95) 
CEO Age -0.005* -0.005* -0.005* -0.004* -0.004* -0.005** -0.005** -0.004* 
  (-2.56) (-2.49) (-2.47) (-2.32) (-2.30) (-2.58) (-2.60) (-2.30) 
Ln(Assets) 0.609*** 0.611*** 0.613*** 0.619*** 0.617*** 0.608*** 0.609*** 0.621*** 
  (50.36) (49.27) (50.21) (48.79) (49.81) (50.32) (50.39) (49.08) 
Herfindahl -0.245 -0.245 -0.218 -0.214 -0.192 -0.224 -0.267 -0.206 
  (-1.08) (-1.08) (-0.96) (-0.94) (-0.84) (-0.99) (-1.18) (-0.90) 
Herfindahl2 0.367 0.370 0.340 0.342 0.327 0.348 0.383 0.335 
  (1.68) (1.69) (1.56) (1.56) (1.50) (1.59) (1.75) (1.53) 
CapInt -0.175*** -0.176*** -0.176*** -0.178*** -0.180*** -0.176*** -0.173*** -0.179*** 
  (-7.66) (-7.69) (-7.73) (-7.80) (-7.89) (-7.71) (-7.57) (-7.84) 
ROA 0.762*** 0.754*** 0.812*** 0.803*** 0.761*** 0.756*** 0.781*** 0.795*** 
  (4.50) (4.45) (4.77) (4.72) (4.50) (4.47) (4.61) (4.69) 
Sales growth -0.384*** -0.385*** -0.371*** -0.372*** -0.385*** -0.389*** -0.378*** -0.377*** 
  (-6.48) (-6.51) (-6.25) (-6.27) (-6.51) (-6.57) (-6.38) (-6.36) 
Stock return 0.099** 0.097** 0.111*** 0.110*** 0.101** 0.096** 0.101** 0.104** 
  (3.02) (2.96) (3.36) (3.31) (3.09) (2.92) (3.08) (3.18) 
Volatility 2.544*** 2.549*** 2.500*** 2.504*** 2.481*** 2.521*** 2.575*** 2.507*** 
  (9.47) (9.49) (9.29) (9.31) (9.22) (9.39) (9.57) (9.32) 
Cash 1.153*** 1.151*** 1.161*** 1.159*** 1.136*** 1.137*** 1.164*** 1.145*** 
  (11.07) (11.05) (11.15) (11.13) (10.91) (10.91) (11.17) (10.98) 
Leverage -0.752*** -0.752*** -0.755*** -0.756*** -0.746*** -0.736*** -0.753*** -0.739*** 
  (-7.97) (-7.98) (-8.01) (-8.02) (-7.92) (-7.80) (-7.99) (-7.84) 
Obs. 9413 9413 9413 9413 9413 9413 9413 9413 
R2 0.533 0.533 0.533 0.533 0.533 0.533 0.533 0.534 





The proportion of long-term incentive plans has a significant, positive influence on 
innovation quantity but the coefficient turns insignificant for innovation quality. In addition, 
the proportion of restricted stock does not have any significant impact, which is why my 
Hypothesis 3 only partly holds.13 
                                                 
13 An untabulated regression on Ln(1+Citations) without fixed effects reported significant positive coefficients 
for P(Options) and P(LtIns) and significant negative coefficients for P(Salary) and P(Bonus). The fixed effect 
findings suggest that industry differences and time effects explain a majority of the variation in patent citations 
 Panel B Dependent Variable = Ln(1+Citations)t+1 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
P(Salary)   -0.151   -0.204         
    (-1.07)   (-1.39)         
P(Bonus)     -0.122 -0.174         
      (-0.96) (-1.31)         
P(Options)         0.169     0.222* 
          (1.94)     (1.97) 
P(ResStock)           -0.372*   -0.181 
            (-2.31)   (-0.98) 
P(LtIns)             0.152 0.300 
              (1.05) (1.69) 
Ln(TotCom) 0.040 0.011 0.035 -0.007 0.012 0.048* 0.033 -0.007 
  (1.76) (0.29) (1.52) (-0.17) (0.44) (2.08) (1.39) (-0.21) 
Tenure -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.005 -0.004 -0.004 
  (-1.41) (-1.26) (-1.38) (-1.17) (-1.31) (-1.51) (-1.36) (-1.23) 
CEO Age -0.008* -0.007* -0.007* -0.007* -0.007* -0.008* -0.008* -0.007* 
  (-2.37) (-2.29) (-2.34) (-2.21) (-2.21) (-2.39) (-2.40) (-2.22) 
Ln(Assets) 0.817*** 0.822*** 0.820*** 0.828*** 0.826*** 0.816*** 0.817*** 0.829*** 
  (40.18) (39.39) (39.87) (38.77) (39.60) (40.14) (40.19) (38.90) 
Herfindahl -0.649 -0.650 -0.633 -0.627 -0.594 -0.627 -0.670 -0.607 
  (-1.70) (-1.70) (-1.65) (-1.64) (-1.55) (-1.64) (-1.75) (-1.58) 
Herfindahl2 0.814* 0.821* 0.798* 0.800* 0.773* 0.793* 0.829* 0.780* 
  (2.21) (2.23) (2.17) (2.17) (2.10) (2.16) (2.25) (2.12) 
CapInt -0.296*** -0.298*** -0.297*** -0.300*** -0.302*** -0.297*** -0.294*** -0.300*** 
  (-7.71) (-7.75) (-7.73) (-7.79) (-7.84) (-7.74) (-7.65) (-7.80) 
ROA 1.405*** 1.387*** 1.435*** 1.423*** 1.404*** 1.399*** 1.423*** 1.435*** 
  (4.94) (4.86) (5.01) (4.97) (4.93) (4.92) (4.99) (5.03) 
Sales growth -0.597*** -0.601*** -0.589*** -0.591*** -0.599*** -0.603*** -0.592*** -0.592*** 
  (-6.00) (-6.03) (-5.90) (-5.92) (-6.01) (-6.05) (-5.94) (-5.93) 
Stock return 0.244*** 0.241*** 0.252*** 0.250*** 0.247*** 0.241*** 0.246*** 0.249*** 
  (4.43) (4.35) (4.52) (4.48) (4.47) (4.36) (4.46) (4.50) 
Volatility 4.311*** 4.324*** 4.284*** 4.291*** 4.245*** 4.286*** 4.340*** 4.270*** 
  (9.54) (9.56) (9.46) (9.48) (9.37) (9.48) (9.58) (9.42) 
Cash 1.598*** 1.593*** 1.603*** 1.599*** 1.581*** 1.580*** 1.608*** 1.588*** 
  (9.12) (9.09) (9.14) (9.12) (9.01) (9.01) (9.16) (9.04) 
Leverage -1.184*** -1.185*** -1.186*** -1.187*** -1.178*** -1.167*** -1.185*** -1.170*** 
  (-7.46) (-7.47) (-7.47) (-7.48) (-7.42) (-7.35) (-7.47) (-7.36) 
Obs. 9413 9413 9413 9413 9413 9413 9413 9413 
R2 0.516 0.516 0.516 0.516 0.516 0.517 0.516 0.517 





As the dependent variable is a natural logarithm, my findings suggest that a reduction of 
one percent of bonus in favour of option payment (with constant total compensation) would 
lead to an increase of 0.5% in the number of patents.14 Even though the economic importance 
of an increase in patent is difficult to quantify (Hall, 1999), Chen and Chang (2010) report an 
increase of $6.116m in firm value per unit increase in patent citations in the pharmaceutical 
industry. In my sample, an increase of five percent in option compensation would lead to an 
increase of 1.11% in citations.15 For the mean number of citations (444.22), this increase 
would result in a $30.157m rise in firm value.16  
Again, the coefficients of other dependent variables are consistent with suggestions in the 
literature. The change in sign for Ln(Assets) and in significance for Herfindahl is in line with 
the indefinite results in previous literature. 
3.2.3 Innovativeness by Industry and Innovation Effectiveness 
As discussed above, there is a high disparity in the innovation output on a firm level. 
Naturally, this disparity is partly explained by the innovativeness of the industry the firm 
belongs to. Not all industries face the same availability of opportunities for innovation. To test 
the effects of compensation composition separately in more versus less innovative industries, 
I split my sample. I use the two-digit SIC code for the industry definition and dynamically 
split these industries depending on whether they receive more or less than median citations in 
a given year. The obtained subsample for low innovation industries includes, besides others, 
Oil and Gas Extraction, Food Producing and Primary Metal industries with an average of 7 
patent applications per year. The subsample for high innovation industries includes, besides 
others, the Chemicals, Computer Equipment and Electronics industries with an average of 43 
patent applications per year. 
                                                 
14 A 0.01 unit decrease (increase) in P(Bonus) (P(Options)) leads to -0.238(-0.01)+0.229(0.01)=0.467% change 
in patents (one unit change in the independent leads to a 100*β percent change in the dependent variable). 
15 A five percent increase (0.05 units) leads to 0.222(0.05)*100=1.11 percent increase in citations 
16 From 1.11%*444.22*$6.116m=$30.157m, using the findings of Chen and Chang (2010) 
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In the last chapter, I found that the proportion of cash-based compensation elements have 
no, or a negative impact on innovation, options have a positive impact on innovation quantity 
and quality while long-term incentives have a positive impact on innovation quantity. Using 
the two generated subsamples, I now also aim to test for the effects of different compensation 
components on the effectiveness of innovation generation. Therefore, I follow the rational of 
Hirshleifer et al. (2012) and control for R&D intensity. 
Regressions (1)-(4) in Panel A and B of Table IV show the impact of cash and equity 
based compensation components for each generated subsample on innovation quantity and 
quality. The findings suggest that the identified patterns, i.e. my Hypotheses 1 to 3, only hold 
for low innovation industries. In those industries, the negative impact of cash compensation as 
well as the positive impact of options and long-term incentives is significant on both, the 
number of patents as well as the citations received. In addition, model (7) and (8) show that 
the proportion of options (salary) has a positive (negative) impact for a given level of R&D 
expenditures. Combined with my findings from 3.2.1, this suggests that option based 
compensation in favour of salary based compensation components increases R&D spending 
as well as the effectiveness with which these expenditures are used. 
While one might have expected that compensation components play a major role in high 
innovation industries, my results show no significant impact of any component on neither 
innovation output quantity nor quality. These puzzling findings may, however, be partly 
explained by factors that influence innovation capabilities in high innovation industries but 
not in low innovation industries. For example, Chang et al. (2015) show that non-executive 
employee stock options are more frequently used in high innovation industries and contribute 
significantly to innovation capabilities. Similarly, Francis et al. (2011) find that golden 
parachutes are more common in innovative industries and contribute significantly to the 
number and citations of patents. Those omitted factors may have an influence on the 




Table IV: CEO Compensation and Innovation Effectiveness  
The tables summarize the regression results for 16 regression models using different elements of the proportion of 
CEO pay and a series of explanatory variables as well as R&D intensity (5)-(8). The dependent variables are one 
year leads of the natural logarithm of one plus patent count (Panel A) and one plus the corrected sum of patent 
citations using weightings suggested in the literature (Panel B). The sample includes the constituents of the S&P 
1500 between 1992 and 2005 (excluding financial and utility firms). The sample is split in High Innovation and 
Low Innovation industries. Fixed effects for year and industry are included in all regressions. For brevity, the 
intercept as well as control variables have not been tabulated. T-statistics are shown in parentheses. *, **, and *** 
indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
 Panel A Dependent Variable = Ln(1+Patents)t+1  
  High Innovation Low Innovation   High Innovation Low Innovation 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)   (5) (6) (7) (8) 
P(Salary) -0.064   -0.228*     -0.169   -0.342*   
  (-0.49)   (-2.25)     (-1.23)   (-2.10)   
P(Bonus) -0.179   -0.268**     -0.038   -0.140   
  (-1.44)   (-3.06)     (-0.29)   (-0.94)   
P(Options)   0.151   0.289***     0.119   0.307* 
    (1.49)   (3.73)     (1.14)   (2.44) 
P(ResStock)   -0.235   -0.081     -0.206   -0.333 
    (-1.35)   (-0.68)     (-1.11)   (-1.67) 
P(LtIns)   0.163   0.466***     0.061   0.233 
    (0.97)   (4.04)     (0.35)   (1.23) 
R&D/Assets           6.075*** 6.027*** 19.145*** 19.021*** 
            (15.71) (15.58) (11.84) (11.80) 
Contr. Var. -------------------------------------------------- included -------------------------------------------------- 
Observations 4806 4806 4607 4607   4242 4242 2142 2142 
R2 0.536 0.537 0.378 0.381   0.564 0.564 0.524 0.527 
Adj. R2 0.533 0.533 0.369 0.371   0.561 0.561 0.509 0.511 
 
 Panel B Dependent Variable = Ln(1+Citations)t+1 
  High Innovation Low Innovation   High Innovation Low Innovation 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)   (5) (6) (7) (8) 
P(Salary) -0.039   -0.395*     -0.183   -0.671*   
  (-0.18)   (-2.18)     (-0.83)   (-2.39)   
P(Bonus) -0.101   -0.333*     0.033   -0.178   
  (-0.50)   (-2.13)     (0.16)   (-0.69)   
P(Options)   0.114   0.392**     0.099   0.497* 
    (0.69)   (2.84)     (0.59)   (2.29) 
P(ResStock)   -0.421   -0.030     -0.338   -0.362 
    (-1.49)   (-0.14)     (-1.13)   (-1.05) 
P(LtIns)   -0.078   0.699***     -0.137   0.451 
    (-0.28)   (3.39)     (-0.49)   (1.37) 
R&D/Assets           8.142*** 8.065*** 31.763*** 31.500*** 
            (13.04) (12.90) (11.39) (11.31) 
Contr. Var. -------------------------------------------------- included -------------------------------------------------- 
Observations 4806 4806 4607 4607   4242 4242 2142 2142 
R2 0.548 0.548 0.353 0.355   0.578 0.578 0.508 0.509 
Adj. R2 0.545 0.545 0.343 0.345   0.574 0.574 0.492 0.493 
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3.3 Concluding Remarks and Endogeneity Issue 
Using a comprehensive panel data set and least squares regression models, I find evidence 
that the innovation capabilities of firms depend on the compensation composition of the CEO. 
For the magnitude of R&D expenditures scaled by the total assets, I find that they are 
negatively impacted by a higher proportion of salary and bonus and positively affected by the 
proportion of options. This is in line with the first and second hypotheses formulated before. I 
obtain similar results for patent applications, my measure of innovation output. In addition, I 
find a positive effect of the proportion of long-term incentive on innovation quantity which is 
in-line with my third hypothesis. For my measure of innovation quality, corrected citations, I 
only find evidence for my second hypothesis. However, my findings are approving all 
hypotheses for firms in low innovation industries. In this subsample, I further find evidence 
that CEO compensation based on options rather than on fixed salary has a positive impact on 
R&D effectiveness. 
Although the results are broadly in line with what I hypothesized, they might be subject to 
an endogeneity problems. More precisely, my findings might be affected by reverse causality, 
which would be a bias towards the coefficient estimates obtained. It is difficult to distinguish 
whether firms with a specific compensation construction innovate more or whether more 
innovative firms pay differently than less innovative peers. Evidence for the existence of the 
second causal relationship is given in literature reporting the CEO compensation as dependent 
on firm characteristics such as Himmelberg et al. (1999). 
Even though no empirical test can rule out the issue of endogeneity entirely, further, more 
advanced econometric modulation could minimize the likelihood that my findings are 
endogenous. A model could, for example, follow Hayes et al. (2012) and observe whether the 





4. Small Sample Analysis 
In the following, I examine the relationship between protective arrangements and 
innovation. Arrangements which protect CEOs in the case of failure are mostly found in 
contractual form as golden parachutes or severance agreements. I begin by comparing a 
quantitative measure for the prevalence of such agreements in more versus less innovative 
industries. Subsequently, I examine the detailed formulation and composition of the 
agreements. Hereby, I discuss how each component can protect CEOs against a termination 
following failure during an exploration process. Building on this qualitative classification of 
severance agreements, I compare the protectionism of agreements in more versus less 
innovative firms. Finally, I conclude and make suggestions for future research. 
4.1 Data Collection, Description and Quantitative Analysis 
4.1.1 Sample Selection 
For my small sample analysis, I use a part of the sample examined in the previous 
analysis. To obtain firms with similar reporting standards, I exclude firms that are not part of 
the S&P 500. From this subsample, I only use the financial years 2000 to 2004. According to 
the total number of patents applied for in this five-year period, I split the sample in Low 
Innovation Firms (bottom 25th percentile and bellow), High Innovation Firms (75th percentile 
and above) and others (rest). Subsequently, I randomly select ten low innovation firms and ten 
high innovation firms using a sorting process. 
For the so obtained small sample of 20 firms over five fiscal years, I retrieve Governance 
Legacy Data from the ISS (formerly RiskMetrics) database. Afterwards, I collect the 
Definitive Proxy Statement Pursuant to Section 14(a) to the Securities and Exchange 
Commission for each firm and fiscal year and analyse the existence and terms of severance 
agreements in more detail. 
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4.1.2 Sample Description and Quantitative Analysis 
My sample comprises of twenty firms from 19 different industries, as tabulated in column 
1-2 of Table V. The low innovation as well as the high innovation subsamples include some 
established companies such as the CBS Corporation, Home Depot Inc and Southwest Airlines 
(all low innovation) or Hewlett-Packard, Motorola Inc and Sun Microsystems (all high 
innovation). Naturally, the difference in innovation output measured by patents is high with 
the firms in the low innovation subsample generating a total of 15 patents, which compares to 
81,050 patents generated in the high innovation subsample during the five year observation 
period. 
Following Gompers et al. (2003), I use the binary Golden Parachute Protection Provisions 
indicator in ISS to obtain a first overview of the frequency of failure protection agreements.17 
ISS only publishes reports on Governance Legacy in every other year which is why I obtained 
data for only three years in my sample period.  
Table V shows the frequency of reported golden parachutes for my low innovation and 
high innovation subsample respectively. The main finding is the difference in occurrence of 
such agreements in the subsamples. While low innovation firms used such agreements only in 
20 out of 30 firm-years (66.7%), high innovation firms used them in 27 out of 30 (90.0%). In 
addition, the prevalence for golden parachutes seems to increase between the years 2000 and 
2004 for both subsamples. These findings are in-line with my fourth hypothesis. Following 
my reasoning in chapter 2.3, this could suggest that the protection for CEOs in forms of 
golden parachute arrangements has the goal to motivate them for exploration. Accordingly, 
the higher prevalence of such arrangement in the innovative subsample would contribute 
positively towards the innovation capabilities of firms. 
                                                 




4.2 Terms of Severance Agreements 
Next, I present and discuss different terms of golden parachute arrangements.18 Then I use 
the identified forms of arrangements to obtain a qualitative assessment of how well the 
agreements protect the CEO in case of termination because of failure. 
                                                 
18 If not otherwise indicated, all information is based on the examined formulations in the Definitive Proxy 
Statement Pursuant to Section 14(a) to the Securities and Exchange Commission. 
Table V: Prevalence of Golden Parachute Agreements and Innovation 
The tables summarize the binary Golden Parachute Protection Provisions indicators obtained from the 
Governance Legacy Data of the ISS (formerly RiskMetrics) database. A “1” herby indicates the existence of 
agreements that guarantee a severance payment to the CEO in case of termination, “0” indicates that there is no 
published evidence for the existence of such agreements. The sample includes a random selection of twenty firms 
out the least and most innovative 25 percentile of the constituents of the S&P500 between 2000 and 2004 
(excluding financial and utility firms). The Industry classification is the main industry the firm operates in. 
 
Panel A  Golden Parachute Indicator  
 Industry 2000 2002 2004 Total 
Low Innovation subsample   
   
  
Albertson's Inc Retail 0 0 1 1 
Altria Group Inc Tobacco 1 1 1 3 
Brown-Forman Corp Distilled beverage 0 0 0 0 
CBS Corp Mass media 0 1 1 2 
Home Depot Inc Retail 0 1 1 2 
Johnson Controls Inc Automotive supplier 1 1 1 3 
Newmont Mining Corp Mining 1 1 1 3 
Southwest Airlines Airline 1 1 1 3 
Worthington Industries Metal fabrication 0 0 0 0 
XTO Energy Inc Oil and gas 1 1 1 3 
 Total   5 7 8 20 
      
Panel B  Golden Parachute Indicator  
 Industry 2000 2002 2004 Total 
High Innovation subsample           
Black & Decker Corp Power tools 1 1 1 3 
Hewlett-Packard Co Computer hardware 1 1 1 3 
Kimberly-Clark Corp Personal care 1 1 1 3 
Lockheed Martin Corp Aerospace 0 1 1 2 
Medtronic Inc Medical equipment 1 1 1 3 
Merck & Co Pharmaceuticals 0 0 1 1 
Motorola Inc Telecommunications 1 1 1 3 
Sun Microsystems Inc Computer systems 1 1 1 3 
Tektronix Inc Electronic Equipment 1 1 1 3 
United Technologies Corp Conglomerate 1 1 1 3 
    Total   8 9 10 27 
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4.2.1 Transparency and Termination Trigger  
Although the binary data on golden parachutes analysed in the last subchapter implies a 
single coherent measure, severance agreements can vary tremendously. A first difference can 
be in the transparency with which the agreements are communicated. While some 
corporations report golden parachute agreements under the subheading “Severance 
Agreements” openly in their proxy statements, others implicitly or explicitly avoid such 
formulations even though the terms represent a golden parachute agreement. For example, 
Black & Decker (2002) openly presents severance arrangements for their CEO: 
“Mr. Archibald's contract currently provides […] severance payments […] and 
the continuation of substantially all benefits and perquisites for a three-year 
period following termination” (Black & Decker Corp, 2002, p. 12).  
In contrast, Home Depot (2004) does not openly present a severance agreement even 
though a detailed read of the executive compensation unveils that their CEO has guarantees 
that classify as a severance pay: 
“If Mr. Nardelli's employment is terminated by the Company other than for 
cause, by Mr. Nardelli for good reason or for any reason within 12 months 
after a change in control or due to death or disability, Mr. Nardelli will receive 
certain benefits (…)” (Home Depot Inc, 2004, p. 28). 
Another difference in the structure of golden parachute agreements is the termination 
trigger upon which a CEO receives a severance pay. Initially, golden parachutes were 
established to compensate executives after an involuntary contract termination following a 
change-in-control, often through a hostile takeover (Fiss et al., 2012). Nevertheless, 
agreements can cover a number of termination triggers. For example, the golden parachute 
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arrangements for Carleton Fiorina, CEO of Hewlett Packard (2001) shows a high level of 
flexibility for termination triggers:  
“In the event that Ms. Fiorina's employment is terminated involuntarily other 
than for cause, death or disability, or if Ms. Fiorina terminates her employment 
for good reason (generally a reduction in Ms. Fiorina's responsibilities or 
compensation, breach by HP of its obligations under the employment 
agreement, or failure to appoint Ms. Fiorina to the Board)(…)” (Hewlett 
Packard Co, 2001, p. 30) 
Based on my sample, I found that termination triggers can include involuntary and 
voluntary termination after a change-in-control as well as voluntary and involuntary 
termination without a change-in-control. For terminations after a change-in-control, the time 
period for such terminations is often specifically defined. 
4.2.2 Compensation and Benefits 
Golden parachutes vary in terms of the compensation components and other benefits they 
provide. A minimum contract typically includes a continuation of the base salary and bonus 
payments over a specific time period. Obviously, this time period is an important element for 
the evaluation of such agreements. An example for rather minimalistic parachute agreement is 
the Severance Pay Plan of Southwest Airlines (2001): 
“If the executive's employment is terminated […] then the executive would 
receive a severance payment equal to a full year's base salary and annual 
bonus (…).”(Southwest Airlines Co, 2001, p. 10)  
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Another compensation element covered in golden parachute agreements are options. For 
these, agreements typically allow for an accelerated or full vesting. Other formulations such 
as Kimberly Clark (2001) offer a direct pay-out of the option value: 
“(…)the value, based on the Corporation's stock price on the date of the change 
in control or the participant's termination, whichever is greater, of unmatured 
or unexercised awards or grants under the Corporation's Equity Participation 
Plans(…)”(Kimberly Clark, 2001, p. 18) 
 Finally, two different kinds of payments can be distinguished. Lump-sum payments let 
the CEO receive the entire amount at once after termination. In oppose to this, other contracts 
stretch payments over up to four years. 
In addition to those typical compensation components, golden parachutes often include 
the continuation of employment benefits such as a health insurance or retirement benefits. In 
some cases, these benefits can however reach a whole different level such as in the case of the 
Altria Group (2002): 
“The Company shall provide Mr. Bible, for his lifetime, with an office and 
secretarial services, use of a Company car and driver, home security 
arrangements, reasonable access to Company facilities, including use of 
Company aircraft” (Altria Group, 2002, p. 21) 
4.2.3 Assessment of Protectiveness of Agreements  
As discussed in chapter 2.3, a golden parachute might offer a protection for the CEO in 
case of failure. The ideal protection would therefore encourage an agent to explore without 
fearing a termination following negative outcomes (Ederer and Manso, 2011). As I mentioned 
above, a golden parachute can be designed in multiple ways. This leads to the question which 
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design is best suited to protect a CEO in case of failure. In the literature, there are only limited 
comments about the protectiveness of golden parachute. Based on my findings, I describe 
factors that are likely to contribute positively to the protectiveness of golden parachutes. 
Naturally, the more of such factors are included in a golden parachute agreement, the smaller 
is the economic threat of termination for a CEO.  
Initially, a CEO can be protected for the loss of compensation following a termination of 
his agreement. A broader termination trigger formulation might hereby be beneficial for the 
CEO. This is because the executive will not only receive a severance payment in a case of 
involuntary dismissal after a change-of-control but also for other, voluntary termination 
reasons.  
Similarly, a golden parachute agreement can be seen to give a higher level of protection if 
more elements of the compensation are covered. At a complete coverage, a rational CEO 
should be indifferent between working for a firm and receiving a compensation or being 
terminated and receiving a severance pay (excluding the effort of working). If the severance 
pay is offered as a lump sum, it unties the CEO from any firm risk and hence contributes 
positively to the protectiveness of the arrangement.  
The guaranteed participation in firm benefit programs is a further protection component. 
If the CEO receives healthcare and retirement benefits regardless of his termination, such 
termination is a smaller threat to him. As mentioned before, all golden parachute agreements 
can, however only insure a CEO for economic losses due to termination. The CEO might still 
suffer from an image, power or prestige loss. 
4.3 Relationship between Severance Agreements and Innovation 
To understand the relationship between severance agreements and innovation, I examine 
the level of protectiveness using the factors discussed above for low innovation and high 
innovation firms separately. I quantify my results by counting the existence of parachute 
37 
 
elements and the time for which individual severance elements are available for. These results 
are tabulated in Table VI.19 Similar to the results obtained using the binary ISS data, I find 
that firms that produce less innovation have fewer severance agreements than firms producing 
more innovation. Additionally, highly innovative firms are more likely to openly 
communicate severance agreements in their proxy statements.  
In terms of termination trigger, the golden parachutes in high innovation firms seem to 
give more room for voluntary terminations after a change-in-control (81%, on average, 
compared to 41% in low innovation firm). In addition, more agreements in high innovation 
firms allow for reasons other than a change-in-control. These formulations let the CEO end 
his contract voluntarily which can be seen as a greater protection in case of failure. Also, the 
average time that can follow a change-in-control with the CEO being entitled to receive a 
severance pay is longer in high innovation firms than in low innovation firms. That, in 
practise, gives the CEO more flexibility in his decisions after a change-in-control. 
While almost all golden parachute agreements in my sample include a continuation of 
salary and bonus, there is a difference in terms of the time executives receive a continued pay. 
While most high innovation firms agree on a lump-sum payment worth 36 month of 
compensation, the low innovation firms typically agree to a continuous pay for 12-36 month 
(untabulated). Clearly, a CEO is less afraid to fail if an agreement guarantees payments for a 
longer time period.  
With regards to stock option vesting, only 58% (all year average) of golden parachute 
agreements in low innovation firms allow for a direct or accelerated vesting of options. This 
compares to 98% (all year average) of golden parachute agreements in high innovation 
companies. The accelerated vesting might be beneficial compared to the standard 
compensation agreement as the CEO does not bear the firm risk anymore.  
                                                 




Table VI: Quality of Severance Agreements and Innovation  
The tables summarize the qualitative examination of provisions in golden parachute agreements. The “Percent of 
Yes” hereby indicates the number of agreements where a specific provision exists, divided by the total number of 
golden parachute agreements identified in each subsample. The “Average Time in month” measure indicates the 
mean number of month indicated in the arrangements. A detailed analysis can be found in the appendix. The 
sample includes a random selection of 20 firms out the least and most innovative 25 percentile of the constituents 
of the S&P500 between 2000 and 2004 (excluding financial and utility firms). 
 
Panel A   Provisions in Golden Parachutes 
Low Innovation Measure 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Severance Agreement             
Agreements established Percent of Yes 50% 70% 80% 70% 70% 
Openly classified as such Percent of Yes 80% 86% 75% 71% 57% 
Termination Trigger             
Involuntary after COC Percent of Yes 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Voluntary after COC Percent of Yes 40% 43% 38% 43% 43% 
Time after COC Average Time in month 19.4 16.6 19.0 20.0 19.0 
Involuntary non-COC Percent of Yes 40% 29% 25% 29% 29% 
Voluntary non-COC Percent of Yes 20% 14% 13% 14% 14% 
Compensation             
Salary Continuation Percent of Yes 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
  Average Time in month 27.6 31.7 29.3 28.3 30.9 
Bonus Continuation Percent of Yes 100% 100% 88% 86% 86% 
  Average Time in month 27.6 28.3 28.3 29.0 28.0 
Stock Option Vesting Percent of Yes 40% 57% 63% 57% 71% 
Lump-Sum Payment Percent of Yes 40% 43% 63% 57% 57% 
Other             
Health insurance Percent of Yes 60% 57% 50% 57% 43% 
Retirement benefits Percent of Yes 20% 14% 13% 14% 14% 
              
Panel B   Provisions in Golden Parachutes 
High Innovation Measure 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Severance Agreement             
Agreements established Percent of Yes 80% 90% 90% 90% 100% 
Openly classified as such Percent of Yes 100% 89% 89% 89% 90% 
Termination Trigger             
Involuntary after COC Percent of Yes 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Voluntary after COC Percent of Yes 88% 89% 89% 89% 90% 
Time after COC Average Time in month 24.0 25.3 25.3 26.7 26.4 
Involuntary non-COC Percent of Yes 38% 44% 44% 44% 50% 
Voluntary non-COC Percent of Yes 25% 22% 22% 22% 30% 
Compensation             
Salary Continuation Percent of Yes 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
  Average Time in month 36.0 36.0 36.0 35.3 35.4 
Bonus Continuation Percent of Yes 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
  Average Time in month 36.0 36.0 36.0 35.3 35.4 
Stock Option Vesting Percent of Yes 88% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Lump-Sum Payment Percent of Yes 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Other             
Health insurance Percent of Yes 75% 78% 89% 78% 80% 




Finally, CEOs of high innovation firms are, on average, more likely to continue to receive 
health insurance and retirement benefits following a termination than their peers in less 
innovative firms. Other benefits guaranteed in golden parachutes, such as relocation benefits 
or the use of the corporate jet, are less common and equally frequent in both subsamples. 
All these findings are in-line with my Hypothesis 4 that more innovate firms have more, 
and further developed agreements to protect CEOs in case of failure. Building up on the 
thoughts of Ederer and Manso (2011), this higher prevalence of golden parachute agreements 
might resemble a higher tolerance for failure  
The positive relationship between innovation and the complexity of parachutes agreement 
is visualized in Graph 1. For this, I count whether a parachute agreement allows an executive 
to continue to receive (I) base salary, (II) bonus payments, (III) welfare benefits, (IV) whether 
the CEO will continue to participate in the retirement plan and (V) whether options are being 
vested, following termination. I then plot the sum of elements an agreement include against 
two measurements of innovation. I count the number of patents a firm applied for and the 
number of citations these patents received. The plot indicates that for high innovative firms, 
more compensation components covered in a golden parachute correlate with more patents 
and citations. Because of the limited number of patents, the findings of the low innovation 
subsample can hardly be interpreted. 
4.4 Conclusion and Robustness of Findings 
In my small sample analysis I examine the terms of golden parachute agreements in high- 
and low innovation companies. Using a simple count of such agreements in a random sample, 
I first find evidence that such agreements are more common in high innovation firms. I 






By reviewing 100 Definitive Proxy Statements, I distinguish different elements of golden 
parachute agreements and the protective power each element offers a CEO. I find that the 
golden parachutes of the high innovation firms in my sample have further developed 
agreements than their low innovation peers. Finally, I illustrate that in the high innovation 
subsample a more developed parachute agreements correlates positively with innovation 
output. 
Figure I: The Relationship between Severance Agreements and Innovation 
The figures illustrate the scope of severance agreements and their impact on my measure for innovation quantity 
and quality. The X-Axis shows the count of discussed components covered. As there is no case in my sample 
where a severance agreement includes salary but not bonus, no continuation count was one. The Y-Axis has been 
adjusted to allow an easier interpretation. The sample includes a random selection of 20 firms out the least and 
most innovative 25 percentile of the constituents of the S&P500 between 2000 and 2004 (excluding financial and 










































































Prior to my analysis, I hypothesised that more innovative firms have more and further 
developed golden parachute agreements. In my small sample I find evidence for this 
hypothesis. Given the sample size and qualitative nature of my research those results are, 
however, by no means universally applicable. Nevertheless, they might serve as a motivation 
and basis for future research. Similar to the causality in my third chapter, the causal 
relationship between golden parachute arrangements and innovation might be bidirectional 
which may also have influenced my findings. If, as suggested, the relationship between 
innovation and golden parachute arrangements will be the topic of future research, such 
endogeneity issues should be addressed and the likelihood of them should be minimized using 
advanced robustness tests. 
5. Conclusion 
In this thesis, I provide evidence for the importance of CEO incentives and their 
relationship with the innovation capabilities of publicly traded firms. Using multivariate 
regression models, I find that the individual components of CEO compensation affect 
innovation differently. For this analysis, I use a sample of 1,512 firms that are managed by 
2,746 CEOs and control for economic factors that have been proven to influence innovation 
capabilities. For the proportion of salary and the proportion of bonus in the CEO pay, I find a 
negative influence on innovation input as well as on the quality and quantity of innovation 
output. I conclude that a payment using these compensations lowers the innovation 
capabilities of firms. On the other hand, I find that a higher proportion of stock options has a 
positive influence on innovation. I also find evidence that the level of stock option 
compensation affects innovation effectiveness. In my literature review, I hypothesise that this 
effect is caused by the convex payoff structure of stock options.  
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For restricted stock and long-term incentive plans, I expect a positive influence, based on 
my literature review. However, in an empirical analysis I only find evidence for a positive 
effect of the level of long-term incentive plans. For the level of total compensation, I do not 
find continuous significant implications. 
Using publicly available information for twenty firms over five years, I find that golden 
parachute agreements are more commonly used in high innovation firms, compared to low 
innovation firms. Further, I find that such agreements differ tremendously in their capability 
to protect the CEO in case of an early failure. Through the examination of annual proxy 
statements, I find that more innovative firms use more protective agreements and I conclude 
that this may affect the motivation of CEOs to innovate. 
I cannot entirely rule out the possibility that my findings are caused by reversed causality. 
Therefore, I give suggestions for future research on this topic. A further understanding of the 
effects of CEO contracts and innovation, especially in more recent years, could help 
remuneration committee, shareholders and CEOs to find more effective agreements in order 
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Appendix 1 – Low Innovation Subsample 
The tables summarize the qualitative examination of provisions in golden parachute agreements. The sample includes a random selection of twenty firms out the least innovative 25 
percentile of the nonfinancial and nonutility constituents of the S&P500 between 2000 and 2004. 
 
              After Change in Contr. Other Trigger   Compensation and benefit 
Firm CEO Year   Named SA   Volun. Invol. Time after Volun. Invol.   Lump base salary bonus options Other 
ALBERTSON'S 
INC 
Gary Glenn Michael 2000    no                         
Lawrence R. Johnston 2001  yes yes   yes yes 7 month no no   no 36 month 36 month full vesting welfare benefits, corporate jet, 
relocation benefits Lawrence R. Johnston 2002  yes yes   yes yes 7 month no no   no 36 month 36 month full vesting 
Lawrence R. Johnston 2003  yes yes   yes yes 7 month no no   no 36 month 36 month full vesting 
Lawrence R. Johnston 2004  no yes   yes yes 12 month no no   no 36 month 36 month full vesting 
ALTRIA GROUP 
INC 
Geoffrey C. Bible 2000  no yes   no yes 36 month no no   yes 30 month 30 month   
welfare benefits, office and 
secretarial services, Company car 
and driver, home security 
arrangements, Company aircraft 
Geoffrey C. Bible 2001  no yes   no yes 36 month no no   yes 30 month 30 month   
Louis C. Camilleri 2002  no yes   no yes 36 month no no   yes 30 month 30 month   
Louis C. Camilleri 2003  no yes   no yes 36 month no no   yes 30 month 30 month   
Louis C. Camilleri 2004    no                         
BROWN-
FORMAN 
Owsley Brown, II 2000    no                         
Owsley Brown, II 2001    no                         
Owsley Brown, II 2002    no                         
Owsley Brown, II 2003    no                         
Owsley Brown, II 2004    no                         
CBS CORP 
Sumner M. Redstone 2000    no                         
Sumner M. Redstone 2001  yes yes   no yes 12 month no no   no 24 month 24 month vesting no 
Sumner M. Redstone 2002  yes yes   no yes 12 month no no   no 24 month 24 month vesting no 
Sumner M. Redstone 2003    no                         
Sumner M. Redstone 2004  no yes   no yes 24 month no no   no 24 month 24 month vesting no 
HOME DEPOT 
INC 
Arthur M. Blank 2000    no                         
Robert L. Nardelli 2001    no                         
Robert L. Nardelli 2002  no yes   no yes 12 month no no   yes 24 month no vesting   
Robert L. Nardelli 2003  no yes   no yes 12 month no no   yes 24 month no vesting   





Appendix 1 cont. 
              After Change in Contr. Other Trigger   Compensation and benefit 
Firm CEO Year   Named SA   Volun. Invol. Time after Volun. Invol.   Lump base salary bonus options Other 
JOHNSON 
CONTROLS INC 
James H. Keyes 2000  yes yes   no yes 13 month no no   50% 36 month 36 month vesting benefits of retirement plan 
James H. Keyes 2001  yes yes   no yes 13 month no no   50% 36 month 36 month vesting 
welfare benefits, corporate jet, 
relocation benefits 
James H. Keyes 2002  yes yes   no yes 13 month no no   50% 36 month 36 month vesting 
John M. Barth 2003  yes yes   no yes 13 month no no   50% 36 month 36 month vesting 
John M. Barth 2004  yes yes   no yes 13 month no no   50% 36 month 36 month vesting 
NEWMONT 
MINING CORP 
Ronald C. Cambre 2000  yes yes   yes yes 24 month yes yes   no 24 month 24 month   
coverage under the Corporation’s 
medical and dental plans and life 
insurance plan Wayne W. Murdy 2001  yes yes   yes yes 24 month yes yes   no 24 month 24 month   
Wayne W. Murdy 2002  yes yes   yes yes 24 month yes yes   no 24 month 24 month   
Wayne W. Murdy 2003  yes yes   yes yes 24 month yes yes   no 24 month 24 month   
Wayne W. Murdy 2004  yes yes   yes yes 24 month yes yes   no 24 month 24 month     
SOUTHWEST 
AIRLINES 
Herbert D. Kelleher 2000  yes yes   yes yes 12 month no no   no 12 month fixed $750k     
James F. Parker 2001  yes yes   yes yes 12 month no no   yes 36 month fixed $750k     
James F. Parker 2002  yes yes   yes yes 24 month no no   yes 24 month fixed $750k     
James F. Parker 2003  yes yes   yes yes 24 month no no   no 12 month fixed $750k     
James F. Parker 2004  yes yes   yes yes 24 month no no   yes 36 month fixed $750k     
WORTHINGTON 
INDUSTRIES 
John P. McConnell 2000    no                         
John P. McConnell 2001    no                         
John P. McConnell 2002    no                         
John P. McConnell 2003    no                         
John P. McConnell 2004    no                         
XTO ENERGY 
INC 
Bob R. Simpson 2000  yes yes   no yes 12 month no yes   yes 36 month 36 month only vesting The employee will also receive 18 
months of medical, vision and 
dental benefits. 
  
   
  
Bob R. Simpson 2001  yes yes   no yes 12 month no yes   yes 36 month 36 month only vesting 
Bob R. Simpson 2002  yes yes   no yes 24 month no yes   yes 36 month 36 month only vesting 
Bob R. Simpson 2003  yes yes   no yes 24 month no yes   yes 36 month 36 month only vesting 




Appendix 2 – High Innovation Subsample 
The tables summarize the qualitative examination of provisions in golden parachute agreements. The sample includes a random selection of twenty firms out the most innovative 25 
percentile of the nonfinancial and nonutility constituents of the S&P500 between 2000 and 2004. 
 
              After Change in Contr. Other Trigger   Compensation and benefit 
Firm CEO Year   Named SA   Volun. Invol. Time after Volun. Invol.   Lump base salary bonus options Other 
BLACK & 
DECKER CORP 






Nolan D. Archibald 2001  yes yes   yes yes 36 month no yes   yes 36 month 36 month continuation of substantially all 
benefits and perquisites for a 
three-year period following 
termination of employment 
Nolan D. Archibald 2002  yes yes   yes yes 36 month no yes   yes 36 month 36 month 
Nolan D. Archibald 2003  yes yes   yes yes 36 month no yes   yes 36 month 36 month 
Nolan D. Archibald 2004  yes yes   yes yes 36 month no yes   yes 36 month 36 month 
HEWLETT-
PACKARD CO 
Carleton S. Fiorina 2000  yes yes   yes yes 24 month yes yes   yes 36 month 36 month 100% vesting 
three-year continuation of all 
welfare plans 
Carleton S. Fiorina 2001  yes yes   yes yes 24 month yes yes   yes 36 month 36 month   
Carleton S. Fiorina 2002  yes yes   yes yes 24 month yes yes   yes 36 month 36 month   
Carleton S. Fiorina 2003  yes yes   yes yes 36 month yes yes   yes 30 month 30 month   
Carleton S. Fiorina 2004  yes yes   yes yes 36 month yes yes   yes 30 month 30 month     
KIMBERLY-
CLARK CORP 







 relocation costs and health 
benefits and  COBRA premiums 
for medical and dental   
  
Wayne R. Sanders 2001  yes yes   yes yes 24 month no no   yes 36 month 36 month 
Wayne R. Sanders 2002  yes yes   yes yes 24 month no no   yes 36 month 36 month 
Thomas J. Falk 2003  yes yes   yes yes 24 month no no   yes 36 month 36 month 
Thomas J. Falk 2004  yes yes   yes yes 24 month no no   yes 36 month 36 month 
LOCKHEED 
MARTIN CORP 
Vance D. Coffman 2000    no                         
Vance D. Coffman 2001  no yes   yes yes 24 month no no   yes 36 month 36 month 100% vesting  
Vance D. Coffman 2002  no yes   yes yes 24 month no no   yes 36 month 36 month 100% vesting  
Vance D. Coffman 2003  no yes   yes yes 24 month no no   yes 36 month 36 month 100% vesting  
Vance D. Coffman 2004  no yes   yes yes 24 month no no   yes 36 month 36 month 100% vesting  
MEDTRONIC 
INC 
William W. George 2000  yes yes   yes yes 24 month no no   yes 36 month 36 month 100% vesting   




Arthur D. Collins, Jr. 2002  yes yes   yes yes 36 month no no   yes 36 month 36 month 100% vesting 
Arthur D. Collins, Jr. 2003  yes yes   yes yes 36 month no no   yes 36 month 36 month 100% vesting 




Appendix 2 cont. 
              After Change in Contr. Other Trigger   Compensation and benefit 
Firm CEO Year   Named SA   Volun. Invol. Time after Volun. Invol.   Lump base salary bonus options Other 
MERCK & CO 
Raymond V. Gilmartin 2000    no               50%      benefits of retirement plan 
Raymond V. Gilmartin 2001    no               50%      
welfare benefits, corporate jet, 
relocation benefits 
Raymond V. Gilmartin 2002    no               50%      
Raymond V. Gilmartin 2003    no               50% yes 36 month  
Raymond V. Gilmartin 2004  yes yes   yes yes 24 month no no   50% yes 36 month vesting 
MOTOROLA 
INC 
Christopher B. Galvin 2000  yes yes   yes yes 24 month no no   no yes 36 month 
Cash payment 
of stock issuable 
under plans and 
no invested 
benefits  
Executive officer would also 
receive continued medical and 
insurance benefits for 3 years, 
and 3 years of age and service 
credit for retiree medical 
eligibility. 
Christopher B. Galvin 2001  yes yes   yes yes 24 month no no   no yes 36 month 
Christopher B. Galvin 2002  yes yes   yes yes 24 month no no   no yes 36 month 
Christopher B. Galvin 2003  yes yes   yes yes 24 month no no   no yes 36 month 




Scott G. McNealy 2000  yes yes   yes yes 12 month no no   no yes 36 month acc. vesting   





Scott G. McNealy 2001  yes yes   yes yes 12 month no no   yes yes 36 month acc. vesting 
Scott G. McNealy 2002  yes yes   yes yes 12 month no no   yes yes 36 month acc. vesting 
Scott G. McNealy 2003  yes yes   yes yes 12 month no no   no yes 36 month acc. vesting 
Scott G. McNealy 2004  yes yes   yes yes 12 month no no   yes yes 36 month acc. vesting 
TEKTRONIX 
 INC 






Richard H. Wills 2001  yes yes   no yes 24 month no yes     yes 36 month acc. vesting 
Richard H. Wills 2002  yes yes   no yes 24 month no yes     yes 36 month acc. vesting 
Richard H. Wills 2003  yes yes   no yes 24 month no yes     yes 36 month acc. vesting 




George David 2000  yes yes   yes yes 24 month yes yes   yes yes 36 month acc. vesting continuation of other fringe 
benefits for three years  
   
  
George David 2001  yes yes   yes yes 24 month yes yes   yes yes 36 month acc. vesting 
George David 2002  yes yes   yes yes 24 month yes yes   yes yes 36 month acc. vesting 
George David 2003  yes yes   yes yes 24 month yes yes   yes yes 36 month acc. vesting 
George David 2004  yes yes   yes yes 24 month yes yes   yes     acc. vesting 
